Al-Ghaz?l? in one of his major works has argued that:

They (The ?Ulam?`)duped the people to believe that there is no
other science than that of Fiqh (Jurisprudence)…They say that there is no learning
except that of Mun?çarah or debates. The present learned man cherishes hope
to win over his adversary and seeks means to make him silent. Or they informed
the people that there is no learning except the science of scholastic theology
by help of which a speaker seeks to influence the mind of the public. They see
no other science except these three sciences.

The sciences of the next world (=Ta?awwuf) and the learning of
the sages of early times(=Philosophy) have disappeared from the people and the
learning, which was described by God in his Holy Book as theology, wisdom, light
and guidance, has been immerged in the deepest recess of forgetfulness.[1]

The first concern, in this paper, is to define an adequate curriculum
for the philosophical component in U?âl al-D?n. But, we primarily should try
to understand the meaning of teaching philosophy, absolutely and relatively
to the formation of an U?âl? scholar. Accordingly, we should examine these levels
taking into consideration the historical practice of teaching Philosophy and
U?âl [2], as well as the nature of these two disciplines.

The current situation of Islamic civilisation, exasperated by
its weakness in scientific and philosophical thought and by its backwardness
in moral and religious practice, urges us to deeply meditate the historical
determination of these deficiencies. By doing so, we keep abreast with the project
of “Islamization of knowledge”. This action may tentatively medicate the shortcomings
of Islamic academic culture and institution, which became obvious since the
era of decline[3].

Our purpose in scrutinizing the historical determination is to
highlight the reasons why our religious thought has, in almost all our academic
history, negated the conditions of possibility of any sound scientific and philosophical
teaching; to grasp the reasons why this thought has reduced the “dignity” of
the scholar or “?Alim” to the religious scholar, and more particularly, to “faq?h”.
The philosophic and scientific teachings were, therefore, condemned to a marginal
status: all our philosophers and scientists were self made men; hence, the theories
they have promoted could not survive them. These theories were not compatible
with the institutions and the sufficient duration necessary to produce a rich
theoretical and practical harvest was not made available[4].

No one can accept a proposal for teaching grounded in a pure accidental
experience, or in the simple aping of the current western paradigm, which is
as accidental as ours. Thus, we need a philosophical foundation for the teaching
of philosophy. We should corroborate the Islamic case by a universal conceptual
vision. We must, hence, deal with the subject in a double construal of the topic
proposed in this paper: Firstly, an historical construal must aim at an objective
appraisal of the attitude our culture has had vis-à-vis philosophy and the status
it has attributed to the teaching of philosophy; and secondly, a conceptual
construal should try to philosophically, or independently of inessential circumstances,
define the essential pillars of this teaching.

We have, therefore, to address two difficult questions, before
trying to design an adequate curriculum for the teaching of philosophy in U?âl
al-D?n: Firstly, to outline the historical factors which have caused the inferior
status our educational system has allotted to scientific and philosophical teaching,
in the two meetings our civilization have had with the scientific and philosophic
culture: the medieval and the modern. Secondly, to elaborate upon a philosophical
vision, which would be able to formulate an adequate design for the teaching
of philosophy. This definition should attribute the due importance our sound
Islamic critical thought deserves, not only as an Islamic contribution to the
history of philosophy and sciences, but also to the cultural, social and political
institutions this contribution has entailed.

These purposes should be rooted in the intrinsic epistemological
and methodological development of our religious, scientific and philosophical
thought on one hand, and in the institutional and cultural shifts this thought
has operated, by comparison with the late Antiquity and the early medieval eras,
on the other hand. Indeed, this genesis obtained in the history of Islamic thought
and historical reality, as an antagonistic development of a dialectic relationship
between two disciplines, which have dominated this thought and both the intrinsic
and extrinsic institutions which defined it or are defined by it: 1) The couple
of Fiqh and Ta?awwaf and their intrinsic and extrinsic institutions, in the
double meaning indicated above owe their development to an antagonistic epistemological
and institutional dynamic [5]. 2) The couple of Kal?m and Falsafah and their
intrinsic and extrinsic institutions,[6] have taken the same way and obeyed
the same dynamic[7].

Finally, we will try to design an adequate curriculum, able to
achieve two purposes: 1) the sound acquisition of Islamic knowledge: this curriculum
should equip the U?âl? with the necessary methodological and logical devices
which enable him/her to understand the Islamic philosophical, mystical, theological
and legal heritage; 2) the smart acquisition and production of current knowledge:
this curriculum should enable the U?âl? to participate actively and not only
reactively in the outlining of the new horizons the religious thought needs.
Thus, our tentative proposal will try to deal with the following: the first
problem is historical: how has our culture defined the status of the teaching
of philosophy and sciences and what is its attitude vis-à-vis them?, the second
problem is conceptual: how philosophy defines the constitutive components of
the philosophical teaching?, and the third problem is procedural: how the teaching
of philosophy contributes in the U?âl? formation?

I-Problem one: the status of scientific and

Philosophical teaching

To begin with there is a need to address two important questions
that bear heavily on our discussion; Firstly, 1) How to define and interpret
the inferior status our civilization has allotted to the scientific and philosophical
thought in the two experiences of its meeting with it (The Greek and the European)?
, and 2) How to define and interpret the attitude of the religious Authorities
towards philosophy and science, in order to equip our civilization with the
fundamentals of human culture and enable it to achieve the conditions of private
liberty and public power, in a free and modern society fit to participate in
the human commune destiny?

As with regard to the first question one should attempt to examine
the reasons that lay behind the status of scientific and philosophical thought
in our Islamic scholarship. The victory of the foes of true practical philosophy
(i.e., Ethics whose supreme end is Religion) on one hand, and of theoretical
philosophy (i.e. Science and Metaphysics) on the other, was a disastrous outcome
of a fierce struggle in the history of our academic and public cultures. The
struggle in itself is universal: we find it in all human societies. It does
not subject religion and philosophy against each other, as the biased presentation
of it pretends. It is an eternal battle in all human societies, between the
true seekers of truth, whether it is religious or philosophical, and the false
ones. Clearly, we know how the struggle between the Sophists and Socrates ended:
the condemnation of Socrates to death. Nobody ignores that Descartes has chosen
the expatriation, because he has been extremely importuned etc…

Generally this struggle has some positive consequences. Unfortunately,
the negative result has dominated our civilization. The decline was a consequence
of the neglect of the positive result of this struggle. This paper tries to
highlight this historical fact. Some prestidigitators have succeeded to fake
the role of religious interest's vouchers, leading the Ummah to believe that
the superior values of Islam coincide with their interests and privileges. This
confusion has allowed them to exclude any serious establishment of the conditions
and institutions, a true and efficient theoretical and practical philosophical
knowledge presupposes. It has also reduced to naught the efficacy of our religious
knowledge[8].

How can we account for this disastrous aftermath, without contenting
ourselves with this facile explanation? The bad will one could attribute to
these scholars, is itself in need of explanation. The struggle between the good
and bad wills cannot suffice to go forward in promoting the status and role
of true theoretical and practical knowledge. We must delve to uncover the reasons
why our two historical encounters with philosophy and sciences have failed.[9]
The objective conditions in which these two encounters occurred have generated
an ideological misuse of the philosophical thought and infested the religious
thought, which have reacted with the same ideological misuse.

Four laws explain these active and reactive ideological misuses
and dispense us from futile polemics between biased sects: the first is physical:
every action produces a reaction of the same nature, same force and in opposite
direction. This law explains the generation of the two reactive misuses. The
second is physic-bio-sociological: the law of laziness (the minimal effort)
accounts for the adoption and use of the prefabricated theories, even when they
are inadequate, instead of producing the adequate ones. The third is bio-sociological:
the law of rejection of alien entities by immune system of every live being
and a fortiori of every superior living being as the case when we talk about
social entities. This law defines the nature of the reaction: it is a bio-sociological
rejection of an alien body. The fourth is psycho-sociological: the law of wastefulness
accounts for the misuse: one can affirm that the relation the individuals and
collectivities have to the knowledge is of the same kind as the relation they
have to property: if they do not produce it, they waste it; this is why the
legacies generally come down to bankruptcies.

Generally speaking, theories made relatively to the object and
the purpose they intend to explain, as the richness one has himself produced
cannot have but a sensible use: otherwise, they cannot be functionally produced
i.e., be sound and adapted to their purposes. Unfortunately, we have inherited
only prefabricated theories[10]. Only the superficial forms, cut off from their
conditions of elaboration, can be inherited. The skills, values, practices and
institutions which render these theories possible are more difficult to inherit,
or import. This is why the prefabricated theories inherited or imported were
ready for an abusive use, and wastefulness: the first misuse in the medieval
era was a political use wrapped up in a biased religious discourse; the second
misuse in the modern era is also political wrapped up in a biased philosophical
discourse. In the two occasions, the political use is nothing but an ideological
misuse of undigested theories.

The misuse of Greek Metaphysics[11] and European Meta-History[12]
and the reactions they generated are, thus, responsible for the unfortunate
result we continue to suffer from. In a nutshell, we can affirm that the intellectual
pathology wherefrom this failure stemmed is the ideological misuse which had
actively infested our philosophical and reactively our religious thought: the
extremists of Sh??ah (the misuse of practical metaphysics) and late Mystic trends
(the misuse of theoretical and practical metaphysics)[13] have instituted the
medieval crisis; the extremists of Secular (the misuse of practical and theoretical
Meta-history) and late Esthetic trends (the misuse of theoretical Meta-history)[14]
have begotten the current crisis. The reactive responses to these misuses were
of the same kind: two other misuses have corrupted the religious thought. In
reaction to the misuse of Philosophy, the response was the misuse of Religion:
in the medieval and modern opportunities, the critique of the ideological use
was itself ideological. The reactive attitude could not be marked off from the
attitude it condemned by any positive characteristic. It was the same, even
if it seemed the opposite: the extremists of Sunnah and Fiqh, in the medieval
era and the extremists of Anti-secular and Anti-esthetic trends, nowadays, have
had only one aim to reach: perpetuate the illusion of possessing the truth by
the same technique of “sadd al-dhar?`i?” or interdiction which have always prevented
the scientific and philosophical thought to root in our cultural soil and give
the Ummah the aims of the superior spiritual life and the means of an independent
and sound historical existence.

As for the second question pertinent to the attitude of the religious
authorities towards philosophy and science one should examine the main factors
that created this negative reaction. The diagnosis we have presented above indicates
the possible ways we should take if we mean really to achieve a new outlook.
We cannot equip our civilization with the fundamentals of human culture and
enable it to realize the conditions of private liberty and public power, in
a free and modern society, without deepening the self critical work our thinkers
have practiced, as the text of al-Ghaz?l? which has been cited above demonstrates.
The starting point can be chosen with regard to the purpose aimed at: our purpose
here is the fruitful teaching of philosophy in order, first, to educate the
human being and citizen, and second, to mould the would-be philosophers and
theologians. The aggressive attitude these disciplines have been shaped with
and the abuse their mutual overlapping or the bad sorting out the components
of the one from those of the other have entailed, continue to impoverish our
civilization and to create a double intellectual dictatorship, till our contemporary
era: that which dominate the religious ?a?wah and that which dominate the secular
nah?ah.

al-Ghaz?l? has diagnosed this very pathology of our intellectual
life. This is why he has tried to achieve an original reformation by a double
inter-insemination[15]: methodological and axiological inter-insemination of
Fiqh and Mystic, on one hand[16], and epistemological and ontological inter-insemination
of Kal?m and Philosophy, on the other[17]. The mystical ingredient (I?y?`) and
the philosophical one (Mishk?t) are the catalyser of his I?y?` ?Ulâm al-D?n
when purified by his critique of the theoretical use (Tah?fut al-Fal?sifah)
and the practical use of Philosophy (Fa??`i? al-B??iniyyah) by a philosophical
component.

This self-critique, it seems to me, has been continued by Ibn
Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân who have deepened the double inter-insemination proposed
by al-Ghaz?l?, in order to reconcile the core of the components of any human
thought: the component of axiological, esthetic and religious disciplines and
the component of ontological, epistemological and philosophical disciplines.
The condition sine qua non of this reconciliation is, as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn
Khaldân has focused on, resides in the uncovering of the false opposition: "Naql
discarded of ?Aql" and "?Aql discarded of Naql". They have demonstrated
that the Naql and ?Aql, epistemologically translated, correspond respectively
to the "factual givennes"[18] and the "rational conceivedness"[19]
no matter what the nature of the object: either that of natural sciences or
that of human sciences[20].

This critical solution, if it had been correctly understood, would
have been a new start for the scientific, philosophic and religious renaissance.
But the enterprise of deconstructing the theoretical and practical use of Philosophy
and Religion has been misunderstood by the two parties of the struggle: al-Ghaz?l?
was attacked by all the parties engaged in the struggle (Fuqah?`, Mystics, Mutakallimân
and Philosophers).

The outcome of this same enterprise, which was continued and even
radicalized by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân, gained impetus in our current
situation. But only the negative result of their audacious enterprise has lasted.
The conclusion derived from this proto-deconstruction was, as always, the appeal
to the solution of "sadd al-dhar?`i? or interdiction": thus Ibn Taymiyya`s
thought was reduced to the islamist and proto-liberal party which has squeezed
the religious trend of our ?a?wah and Ibn Khaldân`s to the nationalist and proto-Marxist
party which " fascisised" the Secular trend of our Nah?ah.

II- Problem two: the six pillars of the

Educational act in the philosophical teaching:

The just ended section has provided us with a frame of reference
to go one step forward in delineating the main reasons for the status of science
and philosophy in our Islamic scholarship. In relation to this problem, two
questions need to be addressed as follows: 1) How to define and analyze the
specific components, i.e., those proper to the teaching of philosophy, and 2)
How to define and analyze the generic components, i.e., those which frame any
educational system no matter the subject taught.

In the historical component of our study, we have highlighted
the culmination the Ghaz?l?an proto-deconstruction of the theological and philosophical
discourse in the work of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân. This philosophical proto-deconstruction
is germane to the Qur`?nic proto-deconstruction of the pagan (critique of J?hiliyyah)
and scriptural religious discourse (the concept of Ta?r?f). It scrutinizes principally
the relationship between ethics and positive law (?ad?th Quds? and ordinary
?ad?th as possible sources of reconciliation between Mysticism and Fiqh ) and
the relationship between general Ontology and Special Ontologies (that of God,
World and Man) (Makkan and Mad?nan Qur?nic verses as possible source of reconciliation
between Philosophy and Kal?m )[21].

Any teaching system which is philosophically defined must have
six components: 1) the educational aims of which the content proposed presents
a sample, 2) the educational means or the managing of the vehicle of the teaching,
3) the educational ethics or the managing of the body and spirit of the student,
4) the educational physics or the managing of the space and time of student
and schooling, 5) the educational economics or the managing of the two double
functions of the knowledge, 6) and the paidia or the educational politics i.
e., the determination of the role and place the specific difference of the human
being must have respectively in the existence of the person and the collectivity.

Three of the six pillars are presented here, because their definition
should be specific to the objective of teaching: ethics, aims or content, and
means or vehicle of the teaching. The other three pillars are general: they
determine invariably all forms of teaching as we shall discuss in the coming
sections:

A The three specific components:

Regarding the three specific components they vary relatively to
the discipline taught: ethics, aims, means of the teaching of philosophy. The
ethics of the teaching defines the managing of the body and spirit of the student.
According to the Qur`?nic definition, the method of teaching used by the Qur`?nic
message is founded on free dialogue and logic argumentation, or what one may
call the right to good faith errors. In Ibn Khaldân's view the theory of education
is founded on two principles: the freedom as a condition of development of moral
virtues and active participation in the apprenticeship of the pupil and the
dialogue as method of teaching as condition of the development of intellectual
virtues.

Additionally, the aims define the content of the teaching. This
includes two important points; firstly, Logical and ethical skills and virtues
defined by the philosophers. Secondly, Epistemological and ontological know
how and theories studied by the philosophers.

Which are the aims of the philosophical education in its far?
?ayn and particular far? kif?yah obligations, i.e., the formation of the human
being and citizen in general and the theologian and philosopher in particular
(the U?âl?)?

a- How can we define the universal dimension of the philosophical
teaching: “far? ?ayn” related to a general axiological formation in its double
aspects, i.e., ethical virtues and logical skills?

b- How can we define the particular dimension of this teaching:
“far? kif?yah” related to a special ontological formation in its double aspects,
i.e., meta-scientific insights and scientific know-how.

The other important element is the means that defines the vehicles
of the teaching. This includes biographical examples related to the aims indicated
above[22] and bibliographical vehicles related to the aims indicated above [23].

On the other hand one should be aware of other three important
elements in dealing with teaching philosophy and dealing with its issues. Theses
three elements are educational ethics, educational aims and educational means.
Before proceeding further it is worth explaining the essence and importance
of these elements.

I. Educational ethics:

Two kinds related to the use of aims in the teaching: not only
as content of the teaching but also as vehicle.This dimension is related to
the managing of the body and the spirit of the student and the treatment the
society allots him. This process demands firstly the application of the ethical
values in the teaching itself in order to form the human being, the citizen
and specialist and active participation of the student in the conception and
application of the moral and material managing of the schooling: at all levels
of teaching. Secondly, the application of the logical skills in the teaching
itself in order to form the human being, citizen and specialist and progressive
participation in the conception and application of the definition of the aims
and means: at the level of postgraduate studies, the participation must be proactive.

II. Educational aims: two kinds

What are the aims of the philosophical education in its universal
(far? ?ayn) and particular (far? kif?yah) dimensions, i.e., the formation of
the human being and citizen, in general and the theologian and philosopher,
in particular (the U?âl?)? We should think that Islam, being the universal or
final religion, aims at philosophical education. It can only be opposed to its
corruption: the distinction between universal and particular aims and means
has nothing to do with the false problematic of universality and specificity.
Thus, any pretension of Islamic specificity which reduces Islam to a specific
worldview[24] opposed to the universal seeking of truth and values is anti-Islamic,
unless we understand the specificity of Islam as the negation of any specificity
in human aspiration to theoretical (al-Taw??? bi al-?aqq) and practical knowledge
(al-Taw??? bi al-?abr): the specificity in these two domains is the outcome
of the corruption of the human disposition given to him by Fi?rat All?h. We
can qualify it as ta?r?f al-fi?rah.

Accordingly, the educational aims are to be classified into two
categories: The universal and particular aims. Regarding theuniversal aims one
should ask: How can we define the universal dimension of the philosophical teaching:
“far? ?ayn” related to a general axiological formation in its double aspects?
To answer this question one should observe two important elements: One is the
ethical virtues which are the practical virtues related to the seeking and defense
of the concrete truth (professional consciousness) and to the persons engaged
in it (al-Taw??? bi al-?abr). The other one is the logical skills which indicate
the need for heuristic and foundational skills of theoretical truth (professional
fitness) and discursive and communicative skills (emitter and receiver) with
others (al-Taw??? bi al-?aqq).

With regard to the particular aims one should answer the following
question: How can we define the particular dimension of this teaching: “far?
kif?yah” related to a special ontological formation in its double aspects.

- meta-scientific insights: logical and ethical foundation of
the body of knowledge

- scientific know-how: logical and technical skills to discover
the truth and realize it in reality?

III. Educational means:

What are the means we must use to enable the U?âl? to carry out
the tasks humanity and Islam are entitled to claim from him? The tasks humanity
and Islam claim from men should be at once of the same and unique kind; for,
as a universal religion, Islam should never be an Islamic Ideology, or an Islamic
worldview amongst others. Islam must be the source of inspiration to the universal
axiological aspiration, as fi?rat All?h allat? fa?ara al-n?sa ?alayh?. In thisrespect
one should underscore the importance of universal means and particular means.
The first one implies the reformation of the educational and political systems
taking into consideration the practice of the aims indicated above in the lay
moral civil society with a liberal apprenticeship as well as the practice of
the aims indicated above in the lay material civil society space with a liberal
apprenticeship. The second aim presupposes the reformation of the research and
economic systems, in their relationship to the moral and material aspects of
the civil society. In line with this one should consider two points: means of
meta-scientific insights and means of scientific know-how.

B-The three generic components:

These components are necessary to any teaching no matter the discipline
taught. These components are: 1) Educational politics that defines the status
and role of the discovery, conservation, diffusion, and management of theoretical,
practical, technical and esthetical knowledge in the system of material and
moral values which govern the life of the Community. 2) Educational economics
that defines the two double functions of theoretical, practical and technical
knowledge: 1- the production and accumulation of Knowledge or research and achieves,
2- the diffusion and governance of knowledge or the information and organization
of knowledge. 3) Educational physics that defines the managing of the space
and time of the student and of the schooling.

The educational politics is the origin and source of all other
dimensions. It defines the status and role of the seekers of truth and knowledge
in the value system of the culture as well as the status and role of the theoretical
and practical knowledge in the production of the material and moral dimensions
of the social life. The educational economics is responsible for the production
and accumulation of knowledge and diffusion and management of knowledge. The
educational physics is related to the managing of the space and the time of
the schooling and of the student. Regarding the space and time the student must
study throughout his life every where in the world without separation between
work and learning as Islam and our academic tradition stipulate. Concerning
the space and time of the schooling, it is firstly defined by the spiritual
values, religious organization of time and space, for example, system of prayers
and religious holidays and secondly by the material values, professional organization
of time and space. The opposite order of priority is the one which makes the
man a simple implement of the economic system, as the case is in the era of
globalization.

III. The curriculum proposed:

After what has been elaborated earlier and at this juncture of
this analysis it is the height moment to shed some light on the proposed curriculum.
In this respect two defining questions need to be addressed:

1- How to define the relationship between philosophy and U?âl
al-D?n?

2- How to concretely design a curriculum for philosophy in U?âl
al-D?n?

I do not have to expand on U?âl al-D?n. However, the teaching
of Philosophy in U?âl al-D?n presupposes a deliberate grasp of their relationship.
I believe that, unless we tell U?âl al-D?n as science from U?âl al-D?n as defense
of a set of dogma, we will never understand this relationship. But this distinction
will not suffice. The reason is deeper and more ancient than this possible confusion
between the meaning of a scientific knowledge of religion and the meaning of
a dogmatic presentation of it. As a matter of fact, this relationship has always
been ambiguous: since the shaky definition of it by Plato and Aristotle.

In the Tenth Book of the Laws, Plato has tried to determine the
relation between four disciplines: philosophy, theology, pedagogy and politics.
Aristotle's Metaphysics suffers, even in the triple character of its title,
from this ambiguity: he proposed, at once, the title of Metaphysics, Ontology
and Theology. Obviously, the term Ilahiyet has not been haphazardly chosen by
our philosophers.

Finally, the first design of the canonic structure of Sunn? ?Ilm
al-Kal?m, proposed by al-B?qill?n? in his Tamh?d al-Aw?`il wa Talkh?? al-Dala`il[25]
after two centuries of sketchy formulations, even by the founder of the Ash?arite
school, combine the four routes to "U?âl al-D?n" as specific knowledge
of U?âl al-D?n as object of this knowledge. These four routes are: 1)The philosophical
one in which one studies the epistemological and ontological conditions of the
research in U?âl al-D?n, 2) The theological one in which one studies the proofs
of God's existence and unity, 3) The mystical one in which one studies the prophetic
knowledge and life, or the insufficiency of the intellectual knowledge and worldly
life, 4) The legal one in which nee studies the legal status of human existence
in this world (politics) and in the Hereafter (eschatology), in the function
of the relationship with the U?âl al-D?n as defined by the achievement of the
religious experience i.e., Islam.[26]

These routes are interpretation of the core of the religious experience[27]:
the history of the religious experience from which Islam is the final achievement.
This scheme is, in fact, a simple unwitted translation of the four constituents
the Islamic religious discourse both communicated by the Prophet (the two constituents
of al-Qur`?n al-Kar?m: al-Makk? wa al-Madan?) and interpreted by him (the two
constituents of al-?ad?th al-Shar?f: al-Quds? al-?Ad?) about the Divine Reality
and action in the world, both as historical reality and conceptual ideality.
This experience (?A?r al-Rasâl) is at once confirmatory reiteration (mu?addiqun
lim? bayna yadayhi) and critical deconstruction( wa muhayminun ?alayhi) of all
antecedent religious experiences whose development aims at Islam, as final and
universal stage of religious experience, wherein the prophetic knowledge should
coincide with the rational knowledge[28]: the Makkan Qur`?n (the fundamental
inspiration of true philosophy, as wisdom), the Mad?nan Qur`?n (the fundamental
inspiration of true kal?m ) the ?ad?th Quds? ( the fundamental inspiration of
true mystic ) and finely the normal ?ad?th ( the fundamental inspiration of
true fiqh ).

In this proposal we opt for this universalistic and transcendental
vision of U?âl al-D?n, as scientific knowledge of the unifying principle of
all expressions of religion qua religion, the defense of the dogma being the
subject of ?Aq?dah as catechism. Two principles guide the pedagogical vision
of our proposal: 1-The cornerstone of any efficient pedagogical method must
be a balanced one which combines the historical and the systematic exposition
and teaching of the theoretical discourse; 2- This condition applies to the
works of the philosophers[29] more than to the works written about them. So,
the curriculum must achieve two purposes, the realization of which must be reached
during the undergraduate level and thoroughly and deeply reviewed in the postgraduate
level with two pedagogical devices.

First purpose: the tools of acquisition of the Islamic knowledge
in U?âl al-D?n. There are two tools: The formal and materials tools. The formal
includes: 1) Logic in its wide sense as defined by the traditional Organon:
Analytics anterior, Analytics Posteriors, Rhetorica, Dialectica and Poetica.
The best Islamic formulation for an U?âl? is that proposed by al-Ghaz?l?: Mi?y?r
al-?Ilm. But this formulation must be an expedient, the original works of Aristotle
are not substitutable. 2) Linguistics as defined in the Muqaddimah: Grammar,
Philology, Bal?ghah, Literature and linguistics as studied in Muqaddimah. The
best Islamic formulation for an U?âl? is proposed by al-Sakk?k?: Mift?? al-?Ulâm.
This formulation too is an expedient; the original works of all the great scientists
in these fields are unsubstitutable. Unfortunately there is no unified philosophical
formulation of these sciences unless we accept the Khaldânian sketchy one in
his Muqqaddimah Whereas, the material tools involves 1) Metaphysics: the original
works of Aristotle, Plotinus, Procleus, Ibn S?n?, Ibn Rushd etc. 2) Philosophy
of History: the original works of Plato, al-F?r?b?, Ikhw?n al-?af?, Ibn Khaldân
etc.

Second purpose: the tools of acquisition and production of current
knowledge in U?âl al-D?n. This also involves formal tools and material tools.
The first one includes: Modern Logic: the original works of Frege, Russell,
Wittgenstein, Quine etc. and Hermeneutics: the original works of Schleirmacher,
Heidegger, Gadamer etc. The material tool includes philosophy of religion: positive
one: the original work of Hegel as founder of the systematic philosophy of religion;
Negative one: the original work of Marx as founder of a systematic critique
of the religion. In addition to Philosophy of Language: the original work of
Humboldt, Saussure, Wittgenstein, etc.

To further clarify the first tool one should scrutinize the fact
that the compasses determining the realization of both aims and means must be
concretely instantiated in the handbooks used in the teaching: The aims should
be ideology free and as universal as possible. This is why the compass directing
the definition of the aims must be the History of Philosophy, which is less
infected by Ideology than the Philosophy of History. The means should have a
deliberate ideological dimension. This is why the compass of the means must
be the Philosophy of History. In the two cases, the object determines the relation
to Ideology. History is more susceptible of ideologization than Philosophy.
This raises two questions: The first one is: How to concretely define the aims?
In this respect, we should take into account two elements: 1) History of philosophy
in general, and the history of our philosophy in particular. And 2) an anthology
of texts wherein our intellectual production must be sufficiently quantitatively
and qualitatively represented. The second question is: How to concretely define
the means? The answer to this question requires the covering of two important
elements: 1) Philosophy of history in general and the philosophy of our history
in particular, and 2) an anthology of the spiritual (institutions, values and
arts) and material production (techniques and realizations) wherein ours must
sufficiently be represented.

To elaborate more on the second tool one should understand the
fact that the illustration of the curriculum can be drawn from the determinant
moments of the history of philosophy and from its teachings. These moments includes
the Islamic and the Western instantiation.

Regarding the Islamic instantiation, one can identify five moments:
The first moment, represented by the anti-scholastic Kal?m till the absolute
confusion of Ikhw?n al-?af? which has founded our scholastic culture. The second
moment is the curriculum which has dominated the teaching from the specific
beginning of the teaching of philosophy in Islamic culture till the rupture
with it: i.e., from the curriculum defined by al-F?r?b? and reformed by Ibn
S?n?. The third moment is the curriculum which has dominated the teaching of
philosophy from the philosophical revolution till the absolute rupture with
it i.e., from the curriculum defined by al-Ghaz?l? and reformed by Ibn Rushd
who has tried to restore the universal curriculum whose final form has been
given by Aristotle. The fourth moment has tried a new re-foundation of another
form of philosophizing but that re-foundation has produced the end of philosophy
in its classical form: Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân. The fifth moment is the
thought of Nah?ah and ?a?wah which have taken two ways with three principal
formulas of combination of these ways:1- the revival of the classical Islamic
philosophy, (in the last quarter of the 19th century till the independencies),
2- the adoption of the western modern philosophy ( after the independencies),
3- the foundation of the revival on the adoption trend, 4- the foundation of
the adoption on the revival trend (after the failure of the ideologies) 5-and
the balanced synthesis of the two foundations directly related to the challenges
of the historical reality of the Ummah (the premises of the essays the currently
intellectual Islamic travail is promoting).

Regarding the Western instantiation, one also can identify five
important moments: The first moment is represented by the scholastic philosophy
which has adopted the strategy of edifying theology wherein the philosophy is
a simple foundational and logical implement. This moment has continued till
the reformation and the foundation of the new science. The second moment has
established a critical curriculum which has dominated the teaching of philosophy
from the modern philosophical revolution till the rupture with it which has
produced the last systematic philosophy i.e., from the curriculum defined by
Descartes and reformed by Leibniz: Kant and Hegel. The third moment has tried
a new re-foundation of another form of philosophizing but this re-foundation
has produced the end of philosophy in its classical form: Comte and Marx. The
fourth moment is the coming back to the style of the pre-Socratic form of philosophizing:
from Nietzsche on. The fifth moment is contemporary state of philosophy as social
and literature critique: i.e., as secular Kal?m. This outcome renders possible
the dialogue of civilization between Muslim and Western thinkers, because it
liberates them from the metaphysical and meta-historical prejudges.

Last but not least it is worth mentioning examples from Western
as Islamic philosophy that will scrutinize the distinctive features of each
one of them. The design of these examples is to uncover the essential structure
of a philosophic curriculum. They must be the most representative examples:
a-Descartes: eight essential components: three propaedeutic and instrumental
arts[30] Mathematical Paradigm, Method of doubt, Psychology (The Passions),
the Metaphysical Root, the Physical trunk and three final sciences or Branches
of the Cartesian philosophical tree (Technique, Ethics and Medicine) . b-al-Ghaz?l?:
eight essential components: three propaedeutic and instrumental arts,[31] The
Mystical Paradigm, The Method of doubt, and Psychology (ma??rij al-quds), The
double deconstruction: of Metaphysic(Tah?fut al-Fal?sifah), and Meta-history
(Fa??`i? al-B??iniyyah), The double foundation of Analysis (Science and Physics:
the seventeenth Mas`alah of Tah?fut) and Hermeneutics (Politics and History:
the positive substance of Fa??`i? ) and the three final sciences: Mystic, Logic
and Politics ( the bulk of his work).

Conclusion

To conclude: Our third issue was a practical one: how to use the
history of philosophy and philosophy of history in order to design the curriculum
and the handbooks of philosophy in U?âl al-D?n, having in mind the double critical
role philosophy has played in our culture: epistemological and ethical roles.
Our second issue, was a philosophical one: how to define the prerequisites of
teaching philosophy in general and in our civilization in particular, limiting
our enquiry to the solution of the three specific aspects of the teaching of
philosophy, the three other being general and extrinsic aspects.

The first task was to assess the place and role our culture has
allotted to philosophy and its teaching. No answer but that of al-Ghaz?l?, was
adapted to the situation. The deep meaning and the rationale al-Ghaz?l? has
used to negatively and positively found the double project he has initiated,
was already mentioned in the beginning of this research.

Al-Ghaz?l? diagnoses two pathologies of our Mind and proposed
the remedies his diagnosis entails: 1) How to free our minds of all verbal rows
and debates which have no aims but to defeat the other and impose on him silence?
2) How to free our minds of all false sciences which have no aims but to dupe
the public and influence his mind?

No answer can remedy the academic diseases, but that al-Ghaz?l?
invites us to practice anew: the sciences of the next world and the learning
of the sages of early. This exactly is the very definition of U?âl al-D?n, i.e.,
of the teaching of practical (to know and understand history and value) and
theoretical (to know and understand nature and truth) philosophy, which is the
substance of Islam, when his Qur`?nic message is authentically understood.

A final observation: this paper addresses the topic as a philosophical
exercise, because one cannot otherwise talk about philosophy. This is why this
paper begins by a philosophical definition of the hermeneutic situation in which
our philosophical thought is entangled, and ends by a practical commitment to
the definition of a real scheme via a philosophical analysis of the principles
of the solutions proposed. These three stylistic aspects obey to the fundamental
characteristics of the current philosophical thought.

End Notes

[1] Al-Ghaz?l?, Revival of Religious Learning, Translated by Al
Haj Fazul Karim, Sind Sagar Academic, Lahore, Pakistan, 1982, Vol.1, pp.9-10.

[2] ?Ilm U?âl al-D?n should be conceived of as a discipline larger
and deeper than Kal?m and Theology. Unless we accept to exclude the deep meaning
of U?âl, we cannot think that the identification of this science with Kal?m
or Theology is legitimate. This science should comprehend the body of all enquiries
whose subject is the Principles of Religion and whose method is the ways the
human reason (and intuition) must take to reach these principles and the phenomena
they ontologically and epistemologically ground. Thus, ?Ilm U?âl al-D?n should
be the architectonical science that establish sound foundations to the sciences
dealing with these principles: it should be the philosophical foundation of
their methodological, epistemological, axiological and ontological principles,
as entities pertaining to the realm of ideas and their relation with natural
and historical reality. The system of the prophetic discourse represents, I
believe, the profound structure of this discipline. The core of U?âl al-D?n,
or the unifying principle of these discourses, resides in the religious history,
as manifestation of the meta-historical reality whose ideal essence appears
in al-Qa?a? al-Qur`?n? and whose historical existence obtains in the very life
of the community with the prophet. This core is expressed and interpreted in
four discourses unified in a fifth one which should be their meta-discourse:
1-the pure metaphysical discourse (Makkan Sârahs), 2-the theological-political
discourse or Major Kal?m (Mad?nan Sârahs), 3-the mystical discourse (?ad?th
Quds?), 4- the legal discourse (Ordinarily ?ad?th), 5-and finally in the Saint
History as unifying meta-discourse . Hence, ?Ilm U?âl al-D?n is the science
of the Foundational Unifying principles of five kinds of U?âl: 1- the Metaphysical
and Met-historical U?âl of the Being in general (Principles of general and special
Ontology), 2- the theologico-political U?âl which organize the spiritual (Principles
of the Commuty) and material(Principles of the State) life of the believers,
3-U?âl of the personal experience of the religious truth(Principles of the Mystical
experience), 4- U?âl of the legal organization of human relations, in a community
of free believers who exercise willfully these four functions (Principles of
Law which are distinct of U?âl al-Fiqh, because non reducible to the methods
one uses to legislate: they are concerned with the institutional conditions
capable of assuring the free exercise of the four mentioned functions), 5-finely
U?âl of the Saint History, as a real total phenomenon (Principles of Philosophy
of History).

[3] Cf. Abu Yaareb, Critical Review of The Foundation of Knowledge
by Lu'ay as-Safi, Isl?m?yat al-Ma?rifah, No..14, 1998, pp.139-166.

[4] As examples, one can propose al-F?r?b?’s theories of religion,
language and history of sciences, or Ibn S?n?’s tentative cogito and psycho-physiological
medicine, or Ibn Khaldân’s foundation of human sciences, or Ibn Taymiyyah’s
"novum organum" for religious and philosophical sciences, or Kartajanni’s
theory of poesy etc.

[5] The intrinsic institutions the Fiqh and Ta?awwuf define are
those which frame the production, preservation, diffusion and management of
the knowledge these disciplines are origin of. The extrinsic institutions are
the cultural and social institutions which pertain to the obedience of this
knowledge and the moral authority they exercise: for example the meager institutions
of Justice and charity for the Fiqh and no less rudimentary institutions of
expression of public opinion and public superstitious religiosity for the Ta?awwuf.
The rival relation between Fiqh and Ta?awwuf has no need of proof. This rivalry
obtains between the knowledge they pretend to be voucher of and between the
institutions they use and abuse.

[6] The intrinsic institutions of Kal?m and Philosophy are those
which frame the teaching of these disciplines: quasi naught, our philosophers
and scientists being generally self made men. The extrinsic ones are those one
can attribute to the natural sciences (false or true) the philosophers are supposed
possessors of, and especially Medicine, Astronomy, Alchemy, Astrology etc...
or from human sciences (false and true) normally object of the scientific knowledge
of Mutakallimun, and especially Literature critique (religious and secular),
History (religious and secular), etc.. Here too the relation is of the same
kind: the same mechanism governs the rivalries between Kal?m and Philosophy:
it was not an epistemological emulation, but a rivalry of interests and privileges,
always determined by the degree of the flattery of the Sul??n and his court,
the signs of any status being the near-mindedness (positive status) or fare-mindedness
(negative status) relatively to the arbitrariness of the sovereign.

[7] The dialectic relationship between the members of these couples
is obvious. But we can affirm that the same dialectic relationship obtains even
between the couples themselves, i.e., the first couple (The practical one: Fiqh
and Ta?awwuf) and the second couple (The theoretical one: Kal?m and Falsafah)
are related by the same law: antagonistic development. This antagonistic relationship
has created a fracture of the body of scholarship and generated the following
double alliance in the political and social issues: the alliance between Ta?awwuf
and philosophy (as knowledgeable authority generally allied to the opposition)
against the alliance between fiqh and Kal?m (as knowledgeable authority generally
allied to the government).

[8] The reason is, I believe, the misuse of the principle of Isti?h?b
al-?al. Instead of introducing a free human legislation where there are not
A?k?m (ma laysa f?hi ?ukmun huwa ?al? al-nafy al-a?l? aw ?al? al-bar?`ah al-a?liyyah,
in Ghaz?l?an terms), the principle of laziness has led our Fuqah?` to the bad
solutions whose aftermath is the rudimentary character of our institutions:
the solution of farfetched analogy (qiy?s ghayr r?ji?) or the simple adoption
of the uses. Thus, they have legitimated the adoption of the political and economical
institutions of the empires whose territories have been inherited by Isl?m.
This adoption was the principal cause of the failure we have seen in our political
and economical decline: the Isl?mic revolution was unwittingly completely negated.
Thus our ?Ulam?` who have reduced U?âl al-Fiqh to the simple methodological
problem of legal formulation were not aware of the core of Shar??ah, i.e., the
institutional condition able to organize and manage the laws and the activities
they govern. Without this meaning the Ijtih?d as way leading to know and the
Jid?d as way leading to achieve the ?aqq are a simple fiction in the heads of
the Fuqah?`. This truth is outspoken in two examples. The first example is the
judiciary system. It was submitted to the arbitrary of the sul??n and the morality
of the Judge. This is why our history of this institution is reduced to some
anecdotes related to these two themes. There were no institutions able to protect
this essential function of any organized life: the simple knowledge and morality
of the judge and the good pleasure of the sul??n are not sufficient guarantee
of a good management of justice. The second example is more eloquent: the system
of inheritance defined by Isl?m became a disastrous source for the two essential
purposes aimed at by Shar??ah: enhancing ?ilat al-Ra?im (in the verse of sârat
al-Nis?` which define this institution) between the believers and boosting the
welfare of the Ummah (without which the Irth al-Ar? has no meaning). But the
absence of adequate institutions and legal solutions led to a double disaster:
the property became the very source of negation of ?ilat al-Ra?im, and the real
condition of neglect of the commune property. Our Fuqah?` have not seen the
solution inscribed in the system itself, if one has digged in the meaning of
the fractional system of shares: if the property is non fractionable (we cannot
have the 1/2 or the 1/3 or the 1/8 of an animal, or a tree, or a house, or an
enterprise etc.,) the solution cannot be other than one corn of an alternative:
either the proprietors end the existence of the property or they invent a system
of management by a third person mandated by them. This system is the unique
solution adequate with the two finalities and the fractional character of the
Isl?mic system of inheritance: the symbolic medium sharable is manageable and
can develop and promote “Irth al-Ar?” and “?ilat al-Ra?im”.

[9] One can define these meetings with philosophy as "chance
encounters", because they preceded the normal epistemological development
of the theoretical disciplines in which our culture has invented or inherited.
Philosophy, as al-F?r?b? has yet highlighted, was not an autochthon plant, but
an alien one. It has got the normal condition of auto-development: neither adequate
institutions, nor sufficient duration.

[10] One can state the same proposition for almost all our institutions,
no matter what their nature; but we do not intend to digress.

[11] Any knowledgeable scholar generally knows that the theoretical
and practical theories of ancient and medieval eras were positively grounded
in Metaphysics (and negatively in Meta-history): either Platonic, or Aristotelian,
or Plotinian. Ras?`il Ikhw?n al-?af? represents the very incarnation of this
misuse in its absolute form. The reactive forms cannot be recited: all the literature
of Sunni thought (Ash?arite and ?anbalite) have unfortunately these characteristics.

[12] Any knowledgeable scholar generally knows that the theoretical
and practical theories of modern and contemporary eras are positively grounded
in Meta-history (and negatively in Metaphysics): either Cartesian, or Leibnizian,
or Kantian. The Arabic Marxian literature represents the very incarnation of
this misuse in its absolute form. The reactive form does not need any instantiation:
all the literature of al-?a?wah is unfortunately of this kind.

[13] al-Ghaz?l?, Tah?fut al-Fal?sifah: presents a solution to
the double problem of philosophical analytics and scientific power.

[14] al-Ghaz?l?, Fa??`i? al-B??iniyyah: presents a solution to
the double problem of religious hermeneutics and political power.

[15] Only one dimension of this project was wittingly conceived
of: the insemination of philosophical skills and rational virtues in our traditional
sciences. The other B??iniyyah: presents a solution to the double problem of
religious hermeneutics and political power. Only one dimension of this project
was wittingly conceived of: the insemination of philosophical skills and rational
virtues in our traditional sciences. The other constituent of the project is
the opposite one: the insemination of religious skills and moral virtues in
the rational sciences. Indeed, the justification al-Ghaz?l? presents in his
I?y?` is more general. It includes the two aspects:" Even the religious
learning have become obsolete…They duped the people to believe that there is
no other science than that of Fiqh (Jurisprudence)…They say that there is no
learning except that of Mun?çarah or debates. The present learned man cherishes
hope to victory over his adversary and seeks means to make him silent. Or they
informed the people that there is no learning except the science of scholastic
theology by help of which a speaker seeks to influence the mind of the public.
They see no other science except these three sciences. The sciences of the next
world (Mystics) and the learning of the sages of early times (Philosophy) have
disappeared from the people and the learning, which was described by God in
his Holy Book as theology, wisdom, light and guidance, has been immerged in
the deepest recess of forgetfulness." (al-Ghaz?l?, Revival of Religious
Learning, pp.9-10).The critique of Metaphysics (Tah?fut) and Meta-History (Fa??`i?)
cannot be reduced to its negative dimension. The Tah?fut tells the real scientific
knowledge of natural phenomena from the dialectical discourse called Metaphysics
and define the analytical criteria capable of distinguishing the scientific
truth from the ideological one, as presented by the metaphysical pretensions
of the philosophers; the Fa??`i? distinguishes the scientific knowledge of human
phenomena and defines the hermeneutical criteria susceptible to sort out the
scientific truth from the ideological one, as presented by the arbitrariness
of B??inyyah`s interpretation of the religious texts and the historical events
of Isl?m.

[16] This first Ghaz?l?an intension is famous: it is the rationale
of the project of I?y?` ?Ulâm al-D?n strictu sensu.

[17] The lecture of al-Qis??s al-Mustaq?m suffices to understand
the second intension of the project al-Ghaz?l? cherishes.

[18] The concept of Manqâl in "?a??? al-Manqâl" has
two meanings: it can be Manqâl ?ab??? = the facts of physical and historical
experiences, or scientific discourse and deeds about them; or Manqâl Shar??
= the facts of religious and historical experiences or of prophetic discourse
and deeds. Thus, the Novum Organum of Manqâl must be here double: the method
of experimental natural knowledge and the method of experiential historical
knowledge: the problem, in the two cases, is: how to establish the facts of
experience, without or within.

[19] The concept of Ma?qâl in "?ar?? al-Ma?qâl" has
two meanings too: it can be Ma?qâl al-?ab??? = the axiomatic presentation which
defines the hypotheses and the procedures of any natural descriptive discourse;
or Ma?qâl Shar?? idem for any ethical normative discourse. Therefore, the Novum
Organum of Ma?qâl must be here double: the method of analytic discourse for
"axiometizing" the natural sciences= mathematics and logic; and the
method of hermeneutic discourse for "axiometizing" the human sciences=
hermeneutics and linguistics.

[20] There is an epistemological paradox in the critical work
of these thinkers. Ibn Taymiyyah has systematically criticized the ancient organum
(Aristotle's logic) of the philosophical knowledge; but his proposals about
the novum organum (His alternative logic) was sketchy; his proposals about the
novum orgnum in religious knowledge was systematic (structural hermeneutics
to interprete al-Qur`?n and historical enquiry to establish religious tradition);
but his critique of the traditional one was sketchy. One can say exactly the
same thing of Ibn Khaldân; but in opposite sense respectively to all these terms
of the epistemological Isl?mic situation of knowledge.

[21] The possible cases of fundamental theological struggle may
be determined by the Cartesian product of the elements members of this set plus
two, and the multiplication of the result by four levels of consideration, i.e.,:
{[(4x4) =16] + 2 (the affirmation and negation of the set) x 4 (the four possibilities
of considering the 18 cases each in itself or relatively to the reality it is
about, in itself or actively and passively, i.e., the text, the reality and
the two sense of the relation between them) = 72. (One can, even ironically,
compare this with the theory of al-Baghd?d?, about the 73 firqah. The 73 Firqah
being, for us, the set whose subsets are the 72 ones mathematically deduced:
this global set is the firqah al-N?jiyah, i.e., every mujtahid is blessed)

[22] Some sets of thinkers represent this universal conception
without ethnical or cultural distinction. But, for historical and cultural reasons
we must attribute to our thinkers the importance they deserve in the universal
pantheon:

1-First set: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus etc.

2-Second set: al-F?r?b?, Ibn S?n?, al-Ghaz?l?, al-Suhraward?,
Moll? ?adr? etc.

3-Third set: Ibn Qurr? (grand son of), Al-B?rân?, Ibn Al-Haytham,
al-Khayy?m,

At-?âs?, etc.

4-Fourth set: Ibn ?azm, Ibn B?jah, Ibn ?ufayl, Ibn Rushd, Ibn
?Arab? etc.

5-Fifth set: Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, Hume, Kant etc.

6-Six set: Herder, Goethe, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc.

7-Sixth set: Marx, Comte, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger etc. The
core of the equation of the teaching of Isl?mic Philosophy: al-Ghaz?l?, Ibn
Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân.

[23] It is obvious that the bibliography should be elected from
the works of the philosophers chosen by the curriculum as examples of the aims
targeted, as we will do in the curriculum proposed by this paper.

[24] The pretension of a specific Isl?mic worldview is the source
of two spiritual malformations and two correspondent social diseases: 1- internal
malformation, generating a continual civil war between the firaq, because each
of them pretends to be the unique possessor of this unique worldview; 2- external
malformation, generating a pathological reactive attitude: this worldview is
always defined by the negation of an imaginary adversary generally identified
with the false ghost of Occident, germane of the same false entity called Orient.
Isl?m should be conceived of as a matrix of infinity of worldviews as Nature
is a matrix of infinity of cosmologies. As a matter of fact, the Saint Qur`?n
defines the religious (axiological and historical) and the natural (= epistemological
and ontological) phenomena as Ayat or Kalimat All?h. Thus they can not be confounded
with any conception or interpretation one can have of them. They transcend any
knowledge one pretends to have got of them: this must be the deep meaning of
the concept Ijtih?d as alternative to the spiritual infallible authorities in
corrupted religions. If it is ridiculous to think that the nature is the one
of the cosmogonies one can imagine, it is ridiculous too to think that Isl?m
is one of the worldviews one can imagine.

[25] Cf. Al-B?qillan?'s, Tamh?d al-Aw?`il wa Talkh?? al-Dal?`il,
edited and published by ?Im?d al-D?n A?mad ?aydar, 3rd edition (Beirut: Mu`assast
al-Kutub al-Thaq?fiyyah, 1993), pp. 23-24.

[26] The routes one and three are the open ones. The routes two
and four are the closed ones. If we consider Isl?m from the horizon of the open
routes, the philosophical and mystical visions obtain. If we consider it from
the horizon of the closed routes the theological and legal visions obtain. The
first double access to the religious experience represents the universal and
transcendent dimension of Isl?m: Makkan Qur`?n and ?ad?th Quds?. The second
access to the religious experience represents the particular and historical
Islam: Mad?nan Qur`?n and normal ?ad?th.

[27] This is why the discipline of Comparative Religion, in its
double sense, (intrinsic: an-Ni?al; and extrinsic: al-Milal) is included in
the project of al-B?qill?n?, even if he hesitates between the two poles above
indicated: philosophy of religion on one hand and defensive panegyric of one
vision of the religion on the other, i.e., the Ash?arite one. The discipline
has always swung between these poles we have seen: it is rarely universalistic
and transcendentalist and consider all religions as development and evolution
(by essay and error: as one can understand the deep meaning of al-Qa?a? al-Qur`?n?)
of the same tree whose final outcome is Islam; but it is often particularistic
and historicist and consider all other religions false ones, whose development
is the depart form the true religion, or Islam. These two attitudes stem from
the two antagonistic visions we have mentioned. The debate B?qillan? and Ibn
?azm have expanded to include the negation of rational truth (Sophists and Pyrrhonists)
and prophetic truth (The two theses of negation of prophecy) means that the
universalistic trend was present.

[28] This is concept of End of Meta-History (= beginning of aware
History), conceived of as infinitesimal theoretical convergence between religious
and philosophical Ijtih?d? knowledge and as a practical convergence between
religious and political Jih?d? action; the task being the historical realization
of the divine laws: al-taw??? bi al-?aqq wa al-Taw??? bi al-?abr.

[29] In the works of philosophers, the historical determination
is intrinsic, because the original works are essentially polemical (as debate
with the philosophies they try to refute) and systematic ones (as foundation
of the system they try to construct). Therefore, the original works are paradigms
not only of the philosophical theories but also of the styles of philosophizing.
The learning of the latter is more important than the former.

[30] These disciplines are neither indicated nor recited in his
famous philosophical tree. Their nature is indefinite. They pertain neither
to Metaphysic (the root) nor to Physics (the trunk) nor even to the three branches
of the tree. Their nature is therefore reducible to their function: paradigm
of rationality, psychological obstacles to knowledge (passions) and the method
as compromise between these two dimensions of the mind. These disciplines which
are out of the three components of the tree represent its true root. As for
the branches, their structure is of the same kind: the dualistic vision of Descartes
renders the Medicine a middle term between Mechanics and Ethics because the
human body as a simple machine obeys to the science of the Matter (Space and
Movement) and the mind to the science of the Spirit (Volition and Reason). The
correspondence between Method and Medicine is clear: the method is a preventive
medicine and the medicine is a curative method in Cartesian terms.

[31] The reason why we have chosen to begin our instantiation
by a Western example is obvious: the functions of the components of the system
and their inter-relations became more understandable in modern philosophy. al-Ghaz?l?
has never written treatises related to the teaching of Philosophy, like the
Principles of Philosophy of Descartes. His Maq??id al-Fal?sifah is a simple
epitome of the philosophical knowledge in order to refute it, even if this book
has played a great role in the teaching of philosophy both in Latin Occident
and Isl?mic Orient. But the propaedeutic disciplines and the branches of the
trunk of his "tree" in his work have the same functions and nature.
Therefore, we have not to repeat the same analyses. However, the difference
of the epistemological paradigm and of the branches of the tree deserves a little
comment. The mathematical paradigm is different of the mystical one, only by
the subject matter. As a matter of fact, the mode of mathematical knowledge
Descartes promotes is not that of an Euclidean demonstration; but that of the
intellectual intuition (Cf. above all his Regulae), as the mode promoted by
al. As for the difference of the branches, one can say that, in this case too,
it is related to the matter subjet of knowledge and not to its nature: the knowledge
they vision pertains to the arts of domination, which is in Cartesian thought
physical (Essentially Physical or Natural sciences), and in al-Ghaz?l?an thought
moral (Essentially Moral or Human sciences